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BAR BRIEFS
It should be pointed out that the majority of the court in the case
based their affirming decision on the principal grounds that the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in reviewing the original proceedings, were confined by
statute governing appellate procedure to a review of what is in that jurisdiction referred to as the common law record-consisting of the indictment,
the judgment on guilty plea, minute entry bearing on sentence and the
sentence itself-and that the United States Supreme Court could review only
the same record. However, the majority of the court did go further and state
that it appearing from the judgment on guilty plea that defendant had been
fully appraised of his rights and consciously chose to dispense with counsel,
they could not consider that he had been deprived of due process of law.
Petitioner was referred back to the appropriate state courts and remedies
provided to appeal other possible grounds for error such as his racial handicap and mental capacity and his ability or inability to make an intelligent
choice.
But, as urged by Justice Murphy, in his strong dissent, when other undisputed facts appeared in the record which were gathered from testimony
taken at a hearing after conviction in mitigation of sentence and from
information supplied the Illinois State Penitentiary by the State's Attorney,
in a case such as this involving a man's life or liberty, these facts should
not be disregarded when justice demands their use.
To any observer, it must appear that in reaching any intelligent decision,
all facts available and competent as evidence should be taken into consideration and judgment rendered thereon. Excessive dependence on legal technicalities seem singularly out of place where a man's freedom is at issue-any
means of insuring a thorough scanning of all the material facts available
should be adopted in such cases. Particularly, here, where the majority
ruling will remand the petitioner to his state courts to commence again the
long and devious quest for his freedom, which might well call for an ultimate
adjudication of his rights again by the United States Supreme Court.
In conclusion, looking to the effect of a waiver by the accused of his
right to assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution, there can be no
doubt but that such defendant may choose to dispense with counsel or to
plead guilty if he so desires. However, there is considerable merit in the
suggestion of Justice Murphy in the dissenting opinion above referred to,
that such election by an accused should be conditioned to the presence of
affirmative evidence of an intelligent waiver before it can be valid. He
proceeds, "It is no excuse that the individual is willing to forego certain
basic rights unless we are certain that he has a full and intelligent comprehension of what he is doing. Otherwise we take from due process of law a
substantial part of its content."
The attractiveness of the parcel is no guaranty of the worth of its
contents. Similarly, the adherence to form displayed in the judicial record
should not give rise to the presumption that the substantial rights of the
parties to the action have been effectively preserved. And no sound reason
is noted that might operate as a rebuttal of the virtues manifest in the
test advanced by Justice Murphy for the termination of the validity of a
waiver of the basic rights of an accused.
JOHN D. BUTTERWICK.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION-CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING
OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION OR TRANSACTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE
SAME SUBJECT OF AcTION.-Plaintiff while employed by defendant company

suffered personal injuries as the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. Plaintiff recovered in some measure from his injuries and reported to
defendants manager for "light work". Upon refusal of plaintiff to sign a
release exonerating defendant from liability for said injuries, plaintiff was
discharged. Thereupon plaintiff brought an action alleging as his first

BAR BRIEFS
cause of action personal injuries, and as his second cause of action wrongful
discharge. Held: Lower court erred in overruling, defendant's demurrer on
grounds of misjoinder of causes of action. The purpose of the statute is to
permit the consolidation of causes of action when the facts as to all may be
stated as a connected whole, are so restricted in scope that they may be
examined in relation to each other, and are directed to the same subject
matter which constitutes one general right. Pressley v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.
39 S. E. 2d 382 (N. C. 1946).
The above case is based upon an interpretation of a portion of the
permissive joinder-of-causes-of-action section of the code which provides
"The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action,
of legal or equitable nature, or both, where they all arise out of-1. The same
transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action."
N.C.G.S. sec. 1-123 (1943). A similar provision appears in the N.D.R.C. sec.
28-0703 (1943). This section providing for permissive joinder of causes of
action has been the subject of much discussion and the decisions are far from
harmonious.
The word transaction has been defined as "whatever may be done by
one person which affects another's rights, and out of which a cause of
action may arise". Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399 (1877). Pomeroy
has defined transaction as "A negotiation, or a proceeding, or a conduct of
business, between the parties, of such a nature that it produces, as necessary
results, two or more different primary rights in favor of the plaintiff, and
wrongs done by the defendant which are violations of such rights."
Pomeroy's Code Remedies, sec. 367 (4th Ed. 1904).
The phrase subject of action has not lent itself to a clear and concise
definition. A cause of this lack of clarity is due to failure to recognize and to
distinguish between "cause of action" and "subject of action". "Cause of
action" is the wrong and the right of redress while the elements of "subject
of the action", are the primary right and its infringement. Stone v. Case,
34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960 (1912). Pomeroy has said "the term 'subject of
action', found in the Code in this and one or two other sections, was doubtless
employed by its authors and the legislature as synonymous with, or rather in
place of, 'subject-matter of the action'. I can conceive of no other interpretation which will apply to the phrase and meet all the requirements of the
context. 'Subject-matter of the action' is not the 'cause of action', nor the
'object of the action'. It rather describes the physical facts, the things real
or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the
suit is prosecuted. It is possible, therefore, that several different 'transactions' should have a connection with this 'subject matter', or, what seems
to me to be the same thing, with this 'subject of action' "." Pomeroy's Code
Remedies, sec. 369 (4th Ed, 1904). The application of these rules to "possessory and proprietary actions, whether involving real or personal property,
the subject of action is composed of plaintiffs primary right, together with
the specific property itself." McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564 N. W. 445
(1910). "Transactions connected with the same subject of action" has
found most frequent application in equitable actions but was not so intended
by the drafters of the Code, 1 Am. Jur., Actions, sec. 86.
In the instant case, the court observes the mere fact "that a connected
story of the several transactions may be told is not alone sufficient. They
must be connected with the same 'subject of action' ". Thus, where as here,
the first cause of action related to an injury to a person and the second
cause of action to a later wrongful breach of contract, said causes were
improperly joined since they were not connected with the same subject
matter and did not tend to prove a single general right.
RICHARD L. CHILD.

